US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0074/00741.txt

Text File | 1990-12-23 | 18KB | 338 lines

$Unique_ID{USH00741}
$Pretitle{75}
$Title{Pearl Harbor:  Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
Chapter VII   Results of Japanese Surprise Air Raid}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Wallin, VAdm. Homer N.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{japanese
planes
air
ships
fleet
army
navy
attack
honolulu
military}
$Volume{}
$Date{1968}
$Log{}
Book:        Pearl Harbor:  Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
Author:      Wallin, VAdm. Homer N.
Affiliation: USN
Date:        1968

Chapter VII   Results of Japanese Surprise Air Raid

1.  Sunday was a Day of Rest in Hawaii in Peacetime

     Sunday, 7 December 1941 was a typical day of rest in Hawaii.  The weather
was perfect with some cloud cover overhead.  The people were taking it easy as
was their custom on Sundays.  The military was sleeping in or eating breakfast
a bit late since this was a day of relaxation and rest.  The accounts of
battleship survivors, which are included later in this work, give the state of
mind general among the military as well as among all Hawaiian residents.

     Although Admiral Kimmel in his Fleet Order warned of a surprise air raid
on Pearl Harbor as a possibility, few thought "it could happen here."  Most
people felt the Japanese would not attack without a declaration of hostile
intent.  The fact that they had attacked China in 1895 and Russia in 1905
without a declaration of war was considered not applicable to modern Japan.
The military personnel, however, were not sure of Japan's code of honor in
this regard, and made preparations accordingly.  Yet, in the various hearings
no American military man excused the air raid on the ground that Japan had
violated her solemn agreement to the Hague Convention.

     There was little real reconnaissance on 7 December.  There was none to
the north, which proved to the vulnerable direction.  It was taken for granted
that if the Japanese attacked, the attack would be from a southerly direction,
where the Mandated Islands were.  But, the trade winds were northerly and
would be helpful to the Japanese in carrying a bomb load over 200 miles of
water.

2.  Submarines

     The first indication of hostile action by Japan was a submarine periscope
sighted at 0350 by the minesweeper Condor.  The destroyer Ward, which was on
patrol duty at the Pearl Harbor entrance, was notified and opened fire and
dropped depth charges.  Also a PBY seaplane dropped depth charges which showed
a noticeable oil slick after the explosions.  It was assumed that the
submarine was sunk in about 1,200 feet of water.

     A message was sent at 0654 which was delivered to the Duty Officer of the
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet at 0715.  After requesting
confirmation Patrol Wing TWO verified the report at 0732.  But a second
confirmation of this unbelievable circumstance was requested.  Before
verification was received the attack on Ford Island dispelled all doubt.

3.  We Are At War

     At 0755 the Navy Yard signal tower telephoned to the Commander-in-Chief
at his quarters, "Enemy air raid - not drill." At about the same time the
Commander Patrol Wing TWO broadcasted from Ford Island the warning: "Air Raid,
Pearl Harbor - This is Not a Drill." Within a few minutes an identical message
came from the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

     Fleet doctrine required all ships to get underway as soon as possible but
some were not able to overcome the damage which the Japanese attack wrought.
As it turned out, it was better that ships stayed moored because there was
some fear that the planes had dropped mines in the entrance channel; and let
us not forget that enemy submarines awaited the ships in the various sea
lanes.  Most destroyers and a few cruisers did get underway and joined forces
to find and confront the Japanese Fleet, but these searched southward instead
of northward.  Perhaps it was best that they were unable to contact the
Japanese forces, for these forces were much superior and had plenty of air
power.  Sunk at sea, they would have been lost beyond recall - though they
would have been far tougher targets.

4.  All Air Bases Immobilized

     True to the Japanese plan all air bases were first put out of commission
so that air interference with Japanese attacks on the ships of the fleet was
minimal.  Ford Island was attacked at 0755 and all fighting planes were
effectively disposed of prior to torpedo attacks on ships which occurred at
0757.  Likewise Ewa, Hickam, Wheeler, Bellows, and Kaneohe were subjected to
dive-bomber attacks and machine gun strafing.  The Army field at Haleiwa was
not attacked because the Japanese knew it had only a few reserve training
planes.

     The Army was on sabotage alert only, and therefore its planes were
grouped together with ten feet or less from wing-tip to wing-tip.  Only
machine gun ammunition was available to Army personnel until well into the
morning.  This fact plus the sabotage philosophy resulted in a perfect target
for the Japanese dive-bombers and machine gun strafers.

     The score board shows that the attackers put all of the air bases
virtually out of commission for several hours.  The figures given before the
Joint Congressional Investigating Committee on 15 November 1945 are as
follows:

     Ford Island - 33 out of 70 totally destroyed or damaged.
     Ewa -  33 out of 49 totally destroyed.
          16 out of the remainder were too damaged to fly. (3 were on patrol.)
     Hickam - 18 out of 30 combat planes totally destroyed.
     Wheeler - 42 out of 83 combat planes totally destroyed.
     Bellows - 3 out of 12 combat planes totally destroyed.
     Kaneohe - 26 out of 35 seaplanes totally destroyed.
          6 were severely damaged. (3 were on patrol.)

     The true story is that the Japanese put out of commission the half dozen
potent air bases in Hawaii.  Although the Army Air Force and Naval Air acted
heroically when the true nature of the attack was comprehended by the
personnel, the fact remains that only a token air force was able to resist the
Japanese or follow them to their carriers.

5.  Ships Attacked by Torpedo Planes

     Within a very short time after Ford Island and Hickam were struck, the
moored ships were attacked by torpedo planes.  The forty planes came in groups
in the early stages of the assault and their targets being stationary, the
accuracy of fire was lethal.  The torpedoes were let go 50-100 feet above the
water only a few hundred yards short of the ships.  There were four groups of
torpedo bombers in all, the first one on the port beams of the ships.  The
following ships were hit: California, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona.  The
second group also attacked the port sides.  The third was from the west and
was directed against ships tied up at the Navy Yard dock.  It was then that
Helena was hit by a torpedo after it had passed under Oglala.  The force of
the explosion opened a hole in the old minelayer Oglala which eventually
caused her to capsize.  The fourth group came from the northwest and was
successful in putting at least two torpedoes in Utah and one in Raleigh.  The
old battleship Utah was rigged as an aerial target ship and resembled an
aircraft carrier; she capsized to port at 0813.  It is interesting to note
that Utah and Raleigh occupied berths usually assigned to aircraft carriers.
The forty torpedo planes presumably fired forty torpedoes, of which about half
found their mark.

     A few of the Japanese torpedoes were recovered from the mudbanks in which
they ended their runs.  All of them were fitted with wooden fins to prevent
diving, and they were modified to explode after a very short run.  These were
new features to the Americans as it had been believed a depth of at least
seventy-five feet was necessary for modern torpedoes, and a run of several
hundred yards was required prior to explosion.

6.  Inboard Ships Hit by High-Level Bombers

     The inboard ships could not be reached by torpedoes, for which reason the
Japanese endeavored to immobilize them by armor-piercing projectiles dropped
from a height of about 10,000 feet.  The following ships were hit by 14 or
15-inch projectiles or later by smaller bombs: Pennsylvania, Nevada, Arizona,
California, West Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Honolulu, Vestal, Shaw,
Floating Dry Dock Number Two, and Curtiss.  Cassin and Downes were in Dry Dock
Number One ahead of Pennsylvania and were hit by diving planes using the
smaller bombs.  The extent of the damage caused is covered in a later chapter.

7.  Losses in Honolulu

     Honolulu did not escape.  Several people were killed on the streets of
the city or elsewhere, and several buildings were destroyed, including a
Japanese language school.  Whether all losses resulted from bombs being
jettisoned by planes before their return to their carriers or whether some
were 5-inch shells fired by fleet ships at Japanese planes is not clear and
probably never will be solved.

     A number of private planes, out for flying in balmy Hawaiian skies, were
shot down by the Japanese in the early stages of the attack.  Such planes were
entirely inoffensive and the slaughter of their occupants was wanton murder in
the first degree.

8.  Officers and Men Aboard Ship and Fit for Duty

     Some mainland newspapers published stories of a dearth of manpower at air
bases and on board ship on Sunday morning, or unfitness for duty on account of
drunkenness.  The Roberts Commission had as witnesses the President of the
Temperance League of Hawaii and its Executive Secretary.  Both of them
admitted that the letter signed by them to the people of America was
exaggerated and slanderous.  Although there were about 11,000 soldiers and
sailors in Honolulu on the night of 6 December, that figure represents only
about ten percent of the total military force, and only a few were drunk or
disorderly.  In fact the police records indicate that more civilians were
arrested for drunkenness on the night of 6 December than were military.  It
should also be noted that leave or liberty expired at midnight, and the
military personnel who imbibed beer at the various service clubs could not
obtain beer after midnight on 6 December.  No liquor was served on military
ships.

     Officers and selected enlisted men whose families lived at the time in
Honolulu were granted weekend leave over 7 December.  Yet the figures were
kept within the limits set by the fleet order.  The hearings of the
Congressional Committee show that the actual number of men on board and
available for duty at 0800 on 7 December were:

     Admirals............................................5 or more
     Commanding officers of battleships..................5 out of 8
     Commanding  officers of cruisers....................6 out of 7
     Commanding officers of destroyers...................63%
     Damage-control officers of battleships..............6 out of 8

     Average percentage of officers:

          Battleships (approximate).........................60-70%
          Cruisers, battle force (approximate)..............65%
          Destroyers, battle force (approximate)............50%

     Average percentage of men:

          Battleships.......................................95%
          Cruisers, battle force............................98%
          Destroyers, battle force..........................85%

     The Army exceeded these figures somewhat because the Army had quarters
available at the duty sites for officers and enlisted men.

9.  Anti-Aircraft Batteries which Opposed the Japanese Planes

     As has been seen the fleet order required that about one-fourth of the
anti-aircraft batteries be manned, with ammunition near at hand.  The
batteries selected were in various sectors, with range finders and directors
appropriate to those sectors.  The 50 caliber machine guns were furnished with
300 rounds of ammunition, and the two 5- inch guns with 15 rounds each in
ready service boxes.  Additional ammunition was furnished from magazines by
personnel regularly assigned to that task and by volunteers.  The number of
shots fired by various guns was given at the Congressional Investigation as
follows:

     Rounds of machine gun ammunition........................275,807
     Rounds of 5-inch 50 caliber...............................1,741
     Rounds of 5-inch 25 caliber...............................1,523
     Rounds of 5-inch 38 caliber...............................1,665

     The machine guns got into action promptly while the 5-inch guns were
firing within four minutes.  The destroyers had all anti-aircraft batteries
firing in about seven minutes although the machine guns opened fire
immediately.  As will be seen from survivors' reports printed later, general
quarters was sounded on practically all ships promptly.  The effectiveness of
the Navy fire is evidenced by the fact that five of the torpedo planes which
began the attack on the large units of the fleet were shot down.

     Mention should be made of the midget submarine which gained entrance to
Pearl Harbor.  At 0835 oil 7 December Curtiss sighted a periscope and
immediately opened fire.  The submarine surfaced and fired one torpedo toward
the nested destroyers.  Curtiss hit the conning tower twice as Monaghan
dropped depth charges.  There was never any doubt that the submarine was sunk.
It is shown on page 169 as finally recovered several weeks later.

     As for the Army, only a limited amount of ammunition was at hand,
although machine gun ammunition was available on some of the Army planes.
None of the 3-inch mobile batteries were emplaced.  There was not at the time
any anti-aircraft batteries around airfields or around the Navy compound.

10.  Deeds of Heroism

     Deeds of heroism in both the Army and Navy were common and in keeping
with the highest traditions of the services.  The Army awarded five
Distinguished Service Crosses and sixty-five Silver Stars; the Navy
recommended fifteen Medals of Honor and awarded sixty Navy Crosses.

11.  Total Dead and Wounded in the Services

     The Army list given at the Congressional Investigating Committee was as
follows:

     Killed in action or fatally wounded.......................215
     Wounded in action.........................................360
     Missing in action..........................................22

The Navy was as follows:

     Killed in action or fatally wounded.....................2,036
     Wounded in action.........................................759

Total killed or fatally wounded..............................2,251
Total wounded in action......................................1,119

12.  Sabotage

     Let it be recorded that there was no sabotage or insurrection in Honolulu
or anywhere in Hawaii.  It is true that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
immediately took into custody suspected enemy agents, including 370 Japanese,
98 Germans, and 14 Italians.

     Contrary to the stories printed in some mainland papers there was no
organized glutting of roads to Pearl Harbor.  In the early stages of the
attack no one had any trouble driving from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor although
such roads became crowded in due course.

     Here it should be mentioned that staff officers and others received
telephone calls at Honolulu "to return to the ship immediately; we are under
enemy air attack."  Commercial radio assisted in this.  All complied promptly,
although the great majority thought it was a Sunday drill, and that the "boom
boom" which they heard (a customary sound on weekdays) was intended to add
realism to the drill.  Even when entering the Navy Yard on the way to the boat
dock most officers were unbelieving until seeing the wreckage and the burning
oil on the waters, and the bottom of Oklahoma in the distance.

     The prevalent story of poisoned drinking water was pure fabrication, as
was also the story of cutting direction markers in sugar cane fields to
indicate the course to Pearl Harbor.  Many similar stories were ill-founded.

     Martial law was promptly put into force in Honolulu.  All except those
with military business were off the streets at nine o'clock in the evening.
Strict black-out was practiced at night.  All women and children except those
women holding government jobs were evacuated as soon as ships were available.

13.  State of Mind of Military Personnel

     There was now no doubt that the Japanese had scored a great victory.
Most of the air bases were a shambles and a large part of the fleet was
immobilized. The damage done seemed great indeed, and spirits were at a low
ebb.  On 10 December came the news that Prince of Wales and Repulse had been
sunk near Singapore.  Two days earlier the air bases in the Philippine Islands
were successfully attacked.  It did not seem possible at the time that the
Japanese could be so victorious.

     What if another air raid was made on the fleet and its reserve oil supply
or its repair base at the Navy Yard - or a landing force of the Japanese hit
the beaches?  Families in Honolulu were indeed in jeopardy and many took to
the hills to escape the danger that seemed to threaten.

     For several months the Army was unable to guarantee that the islands of
the Hawaiian group were safe against successful Japanese landing attack.  This
included Midway, from which land-based airplanes could operate.  Therefore the
Navy was forced to consider Pearl Harbor as a base with limited capabilities.
With the possibility of Japanese land-based planes near at hand it was
decided that Pearl Harbor should be used by the fleet as little as possible,
that task forces should stay at sea a maximum of time, that rest and
relaxation were things that had to take second place in wartime.